Thanks to Trump: The US Now Controls the World’s Major Oil Transit Chokepoints
Global maritime chokepoints play a decisive role in controlling the movement of oil, gas, and international trade between the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and North America. Five routes stand out as especially critical: the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, the Bab el-Mandeb–Suez Canal corridor, the Strait of Gibraltar, and the Panama Canal. Together, these passages handle the vast majority of seaborne energy shipments. Over roughly the past fourteen months, the Trump administration has expanded or reinforced U.S. military and strategic positioning across all of them.
The Strait of Hormuz remains the most vital of these bottlenecks. Every barrel of oil exported from the Persian Gulf must pass through it, with major producers like Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, Kuwait, and Iran relying on this route and lacking viable alternatives at similar scale.
The Strait of Malacca serves as the primary energy lifeline from the Middle East to East Asia, including China, Japan, and South Korea. China, in particular, depends heavily on this corridor for the bulk of its imported energy—a vulnerability long referred to as the “Malacca Dilemma.” Meanwhile, Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal function as a linked system, forming the main artery for oil shipments from the Gulf to Europe unless vessels take the much longer route around Africa.
At the western end of the Mediterranean, the Strait of Gibraltar acts as the gateway to the Atlantic, carrying oil shipments from Suez-bound routes toward Europe and the U.S. East Coast. The Panama Canal, while handling a smaller share of global trade, remains essential for U.S. commerce, moving about 5% of global maritime trade and a significant portion of U.S. container traffic.
At the Panama Canal, a major shift occurred in early March 2025 when a consortium led by BlackRock agreed to purchase port operations from CK Hutchison Holdings on both ends of the canal in a $19 billion deal, replacing Chinese-linked management. Shortly after, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth signed a security cooperation agreement with Panama’s President José Raúl Mulino, and the two countries launched their first formal Special Operations Forces talks, followed by joint military training exercises.
China signaled it would closely monitor any transfer of port ownership, pushing for involvement by state-owned COSCO Shipping, and no final agreement had been reached by mid-2025. Although Panama retains sovereignty under longstanding treaties, U.S. influence—both economic and military—around the canal has grown.
Tensions escalated sharply in early 2026. On February 28, U.S. and Israeli forces carried out Operation Epic Fury, striking hundreds of targets across Iran, including military and nuclear facilities, and killing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In response, Iran shut down the Strait of Hormuz, disrupting a waterway that had carried roughly a quarter of global seaborne oil and a fifth of LNG trade.
After ceasefire negotiations failed, Trump ordered a naval blockade on April 13 targeting all vessels traveling to or from Iranian ports. The result has been described as a dual blockade: Iran restricting passage through the Gulf while the U.S. Navy enforces restrictions at sea. U.S. officials stated that American naval forces were now asserting control over global shipping routes connected to Hormuz, with enforcement actions extending into the Indo-Pacific.
The blockade has significantly reduced Iran’s oil revenue, cutting off an estimated $150 million per day and disrupting China’s access to discounted Iranian crude. It has also undermined Iran’s alternative financial mechanisms designed to bypass Western banking systems.
Despite sustained strikes, U.S. intelligence assessments indicate Iran still retains a large arsenal of missiles and drones, and clearing naval mines in the region could take months after any conflict ends. The Strait of Hormuz remains contested.
In Southeast Asia, the U.S. has strengthened its position around the Strait of Malacca. In April 2026, Hegseth hosted Indonesia’s defense minister to formalize a major defense partnership focused on modernization, joint training, and advanced technology cooperation. The agreement expands U.S. operational reach in the region, even as Indonesia declined to grant blanket overflight rights, leaving that issue under continued negotiation.
Singapore has also deepened its role, approving the purchase of advanced maritime patrol aircraft and continuing to provide U.S. naval access to Changi Naval Base. Meanwhile, China’s efforts to develop alternative trade corridors—through Pakistan, Myanmar, or Central Asia—remain incomplete, limited, or impractical at scale.
China does maintain significant oil reserves, covering more than 120 days of imports, but these are finite. Its network of overseas port agreements, often called the “String of Pearls,” offers long-term strategic options but does not yet provide immediate military capability or redundancy.
China and Russia underscored their position at the United Nations in April 2026 by vetoing a resolution aimed at protecting shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. The move aligned with China’s continued access to Iranian oil supplies during the conflict. Days later, the U.S. finalized its defense agreement with Indonesia, reinforcing its presence at another critical chokepoint.
In North Africa, the U.S. and Morocco signed a 10-year defense cooperation plan in April 2026, strengthening monitoring and coordination around the Strait of Gibraltar. The agreement integrates Morocco into advanced U.S. and NATO communication systems, effectively extending Western coverage across both sides of the strait.
Further south, Bab el-Mandeb remains a fragile but essential corridor connecting the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. Roughly 12% of global trade passes through it daily. The U.S. maintains a key foothold at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, its only permanent base in Africa, supporting counterterrorism and regional operations.
Recent years have shown how vulnerable this chokepoint can be. Attacks by Houthi forces in the Red Sea sharply reduced shipping traffic, forcing many vessels to reroute around Africa. Although a ceasefire temporarily stabilized the situation, renewed tensions tied to the Iran conflict have raised the risk of further disruption.
China also operates a military facility in Djibouti, but it is primarily logistical in nature and lacks the capacity for sustained combat operations. Any significant Chinese naval reinforcement would have to pass through maritime zones where the U.S. and its allies now maintain strong positioning, limiting Beijing’s ability to project power there.
With no clear route to Djibouti that avoids U.S.-influenced waters, China’s presence could become strategically constrained in a major conflict.
While fighting involving Iran continues and full control over the Strait of Hormuz remains unresolved, the broader picture shows a coordinated U.S. strategy. By strengthening its presence across Panama, Malacca, Gibraltar, and Bab el-Mandeb, the Trump administration has built a network of influence over key maritime chokepoints—providing significant leverage over global energy flows and international trade routes.
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