Despite China’s Military Modernization and Expansion, the PLA Still Has Significant Weaknesses
Airmen assigned to a surface-to-air missile brigade of the air force under the PLA Southern Theater Command practice loading missiles onto a launching vehicle during a combat readiness field training exercise on December 30, 2021. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Gao Lei)
China has indeed made significant strides in pursuit of “three superiorities” — namely information dominance, air superiority, and maritime strength — which are considered essential for challenging U.S. military power. Nevertheless, major gaps remain in the capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that could prove decisive in any large-scale conflict.
Global Reach Is Still Limited
At present, China struggles to project sustained military power far beyond its coastal borders. While the PLA’s sphere of influence is growing, its ability to conduct long-range operations is fundamentally constrained by geography and logistics. Unlike the U.S., which operates from a global network of overseas bases, allied support, and forward-deployed forces, China has only one overseas base — located in Djibouti — a presence symbolic more than operational. That base cannot support major combat operations at long distances. As operations move farther from the mainland, China becomes increasingly reliant on a largely untested and fragile logistics chain. This severely restricts China’s ability to sustain large-scale deployments to the Indian Ocean, across the Pacific beyond Guam, or to any theater requiring extended supply lines. While Beijing can likely pose a credible threat to Taiwan and exert limited power within the First and even parts of the Second Island Chain, mounting and sustaining major campaigns outside those zones remains highly doubtful.
Nuclear Forces: Growing, but Not Yet Competitive
China’s nuclear modernization is advancing rapidly, but it’s far from matching U.S. capabilities. Estimates suggest China has around 600 nuclear warheads today, with plans to exceed 1,000 by 2030 — many capable of striking the U.S. homeland and maintained at higher readiness. However, this is a starting point rather than a finish line. By contrast, the U.S. retains roughly 5,177 warheads, including about 1,700 deployed strategic weapons, backed by decades of proven triad-delivery systems.
Furthermore, China’s nuclear command appears highly centralized, making it vulnerable to decapitation strikes. Unlike the U.S. system — designed for distributed decision-making even under duress — China’s structure may struggle if leadership is targeted. Many of China’s newer missile and warhead systems remain untested under real combat conditions; their reliability under pressure is uncertain, unlike American systems refined over decades of testing and deployment.
Even with new road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), China’s nuclear forces currently lack the geographic dispersion, concealment, and strategic depth enjoyed by U.S. forces positioned across multiple continents and oceans.
Lack of Allies, Joint Operations, and Combat Experience
Strategic alliance networks and proven joint-operations capability remain a severe disadvantage. China has only one formal mutual-defense treaty — with North Korea — and even that relationship is strained. Partnerships with countries like Russia, Iran, and Pakistan, though ideologically aligned, do not bind them militarily. This is in sharp contrast to the U.S., which enjoys extensive alliances through treaties including NATO and defense pacts with countries such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, Thailand, and various states in the Americas.
Moreover, while China and Russia — or China and Pakistan — have conducted numerous joint exercises since the early 2000s, these activities largely amount to separate drills rather than cohesive, integrated training. According to a 2024 study by the U.S. Army War College, the two powers still lack genuine interoperability. They have never fought together in a modern war, executed a combined deployment, or developed a unified command-and-control structure capable of supporting coalition warfare under stress.
By contrast, the U.S. and its allies have built decades—or even a century—of shared doctrine, standardized equipment, interoperable communications, and wartime cooperation. English serves as the common operational language across most allied forces, simplifying planning and coordination. Extensive combat history — including major wars and multiple multinational operations — has forged institutional trust, standardized procedures, and the instinctive capacity for coalition warfare. China’s security partnerships lack this depth: there is no shared combat history, no proven joint-operations framework, and no alliance structure capable of replicating the global reach and cohesive performance of U.S.-led forces.
Organizational and Technological Integration Challenges
Even as China acquires advanced capabilities — from hypersonic missiles to AI-enabled systems — integrating them into a modern, multi-domain fighting force remains a serious hurdle. The PLA has undergone significant organizational reforms, creating new cyber, space, and information operations branches. But that transformation has created new problems: integrating sensors, shooters, decision-makers, and support forces across domains (kinetic, electronic, cyber) is proving highly complex. True multi-domain coordination — space-based sensor networks, cyber operations, electronic warfare, kinetic strikes, and information campaigns working seamlessly together — requires years of doctrinal development, training, and testing. As of now, China lacks that level of integration, especially when compared with a peer adversary (the U.S. and its allies) capable of disrupting command, control, and communications through jamming, cyberattacks, and other advanced denial techniques.
Self-Imposed Pressure and Risky Timelines
Beijing’s military modernization is guided by ambitious deadlines: a credible initial military capability by 2027 (the centenary of the PLA), full modernization by 2035, and “world-class” status by 2049. These milestones create immense pressure. The 2027 benchmark may mark the availability of raw military capacity — but not necessarily a fully ready, well-integrated force capable of conducting major operations. The political and symbolic weight of these dates may encourage action before the PLA is truly ready. Nationalist expectations and shifting global dynamics could push China toward risky decisions. In other words, China could be tempted to act on its core interests (for example, in Taiwan) before its forces are fully prepared.
Conclusion: Credible Regional Threat — But Global Parity Remains Distant
In sum, while China is rapidly closing many capability gaps and increasingly threatens regional U.S. influence near its borders, it remains years away from achieving true global military parity. The U.S. retains considerable advantages in power projection, nuclear deterrence, joint operations experience, and institutionalized alliance networks. Unless China successfully integrates its growing capabilities into cohesive, battle-ready systems — and builds strategic depth beyond its shores — its ability to challenge U.S. dominance on a global scale will remain limited.
At the same time, China’s deliberate, long-term approach means those gaps could narrow over time. The coming years will be a crucial test: whether the PLA can transition from platform acquisition to proven, integrated capabilities capable of projecting power beyond the near seas.
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