DETROIT, MI — A Chinese national from Wuhan, Chengxuan Han, has pleaded no contest in U.S. federal court to charges of smuggling biological materials into the United States and lying to federal authorities. Han, a Ph.D. student at Huazhong University of Science and Technology, illegally sent multiple packages—containing undeclared specimens such as roundworms—to a laboratory at the University of Michigan in 2024 and 2025.
The scheme was uncovered when Han arrived at Detroit Metropolitan Airport on June 8, 2025. Initially denying involvement and attempting to delete data from her devices, Han later admitted to both the shipments and misleading U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials.
Federal prosecutors emphasized the danger of circumventing import regulations and deceiving authorities, particularly when it involves sensitive biological material. Han now faces a maximum of 25 years in prison—20 years for smuggling and 5 for making false statements. Sentencing is scheduled for September 10, 2025.
In a broader rebuke, the U.S. Attorney’s Office criticized the University of Michigan for inviting Han as a visiting scholar, suggesting the case reflects deeper vulnerabilities in how American academic institutions vet foreign researchers.
Broader Espionage Threat from China
Han’s case adds to growing U.S. concerns about the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) efforts to exploit American research and academic institutions. Intelligence officials say China’s espionage operations—both cyber and human—are the most aggressive in U.S. history.
These operations include:
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Cyberattacks on U.S. government systems and private infrastructure.
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Human intelligence efforts, such as the secret PRC “police station” discovered in New York’s Chinatown, which was closed in 2022. Two men were charged for acting as unregistered agents, allegedly using the site to intimidate Chinese dissidents.
Over the past few years, more than 140 individuals have been indicted in the U.S. for espionage, harassment, or influence operations tied to China.
The Case of Shujun Wang: A Deep Infiltration
One of the most alarming examples involves Shujun Wang, a 75-year-old naturalized U.S. citizen and pro-democracy advocate. Though he co-founded an organization supporting freedom in Hong Kong, Wang was secretly reporting to China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) for nearly two decades.
Prosecutors say Wang provided Chinese intelligence with information on Uyghur, Tibetan, Taiwanese, and Hong Kong activists through encrypted messages, travel to China, and covert reports. His cooperation with MSS began in 2006 and continued until his arrest.
Though convicted of acting as an unregistered agent and other charges, Wang avoided prison time due to health issues. Nevertheless, his betrayal shocked the activist community. Officials argue Wang’s actions placed lives in danger and were part of a broader Chinese campaign of transnational repression.
Dissidents and Activists Targeted Abroad
Chinese dissidents living in the U.S. remain under threat. Anna Yeung-Cheung and Anna Kwok, prominent pro-democracy activists, have faced ongoing harassment. Kwok lives in fear after Hong Kong authorities placed a $130,000 bounty on her head. Despite some U.S. sanctions during the Trump administration, both women emphasize that China’s reach remains global.
Analysts say cases like Wang’s illustrate that China doesn’t rely on “James Bond” figures—but on ordinary people who can quietly operate for years. If Wang could remain undetected for so long, intelligence officials warn, others may still be active.
China’s Espionage Strategy: Academic and Technological Infiltration
According to the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, China poses the top espionage threat to U.S. universities and research institutions. Beijing’s strategy aggressively targets advanced technologies such as:
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Artificial intelligence (AI)
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Semiconductors
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Quantum computing
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Hypersonics
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Energy systems
Through programs like the Thousand Talents Plan, Chinese authorities encourage overseas students to share scientific knowledge with the state—blurring lines between civilian and military innovation.
Recent examples include:
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A U.S. professor whose genetic research was later used by Chinese officials to surveil Uyghur populations.
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Chinese students who posed as classmates to collect intelligence on American peers likely to enter government service.
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Ji Chaoqun, a Chinese student who joined the U.S. Army, was convicted of helping MSS identify aerospace engineers for recruitment.
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Harvard professor Charles Lieber concealed ties to the Thousand Talents Program while receiving millions in federal research funding.
MSS: The World’s Largest Spy Agency
The Ministry of State Security (MSS) has become the world’s most extensive intelligence agency. Its operations include:
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Monitoring Chinese students and expats via WeChat.
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Recruiting informants on college campuses.
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Using bribery, threats, and “honeypots” to pressure individuals into compliance.
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Threatening family members in China to coerce cooperation abroad.
In response, the CIA has launched Chinese-language campaigns to encourage defections, hoping to exploit fear among those with family still in China.
Analysts: U.S. Must Reconsider Student Visas, Research Access
National security experts warn that China’s access to U.S. academic institutions is a strategic vulnerability. From 2011 to 2018, China was linked to over 90% of U.S. economic espionage cases.
Today, more than 277,000 Chinese nationals are enrolled in U.S. STEM programs. Analysts argue this pool provides a vast opportunity for Beijing to recruit and extract knowledge. Some have called for a reconsideration of student visas for those from the PRC.
The concern is clear: U.S. universities may be unintentionally accelerating China’s military and technological rise.